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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the situation of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front national 
on a number of key elements of party ideology, political competition and party system change since the mid 
1980s. In deconstructing the ‘new society’ utopia of the VB and FN, the analysis shows important similarities in 
the doctrine and, in spite of those parties’ alleged commitment to representative democracy, illustrates a common 
and developed set of ethnocentrist, authoritarian, and anti-egalitarian values underpinning an essentially non-
democratic ideology. The analysis draws on the electoral success, organisational development and 
institutionalisation of the far right in both countries and points to the comparable systemic isolation of those 
parties despite the growth and stabilisation of their electorates.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The revival of extreme right wing parties in Western Europe has attracted considerable 
attention from academic research. Broad comparative studies of far right politics across the 
nations of Europe have provided landmark contributions in the field and led into the 
construction of explanatory models (see for instance Kitschelt, 1995; see also more recent 
work by Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Hainsworth, 2000; Schain et al, 2002; Gibson, 2002; 
Eatwell & Mudde, 2004). 
 
Research has emphasised the heterogeneity of this specific group of parties in relation to their 
varying historical roots and different mechanisms of party system integration. A number of 
classificatory attempts by scholars have underlined the similarities between the Vlaams Blok 
(VB) in Flanders and the French Front national (FN) as members of a same class of ‘racist’, 
populist and anti-system parties on the extreme right fringe of the political spectrum, which 
differs significantly from other types of ‘neo-populist’ parties (e.g. the Progress parties in 
Scandinavia, the Austrian FPÖ, the Lijst Fortuyn in the Netherlands or the Northern League in 
Italy) or more traditional neo-fascist actors such as the Italian MSI/AN and the German radical 
right (see the criteria for classification suggested by Taggart, 1995; Mudde, 2000). What is of 
particular relevance to the present analysis is the concept of ‘extreme right ideology’ in 
reference to a persistent and structured set of beliefs –in short the opposition to liberal 
democratic institutions, inequality as a core value, the notion of decline, clear-cut moral 
differentiation, subordination of the individuals to their community and the search for a third 
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way between capitalism and communism–, as opposed, for instance, to more context-
dependant and ‘elastic’ concepts such as populism or neo-populism (Abts, 2004) whose 
fundamental notions such as the people, democracy or national sovereignty, and their 
combination, lack substantial content. Whichever definitional terms used, populism remains 
essentially a vehicle for mass-mobilisation of existing anti-Establishment and anti-party 
resentment whose identity is mostly one opposing the ordinary people to the political elite 
(Swyngedouw 2005b). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the situation of the Flemish VB and the French FN 
on a number of key elements of party ideology, political competition and party system change 
since the mid 1980s. The in-depth and cross-national analysis of the views and core 
ideological beliefs forming part of the FN and VB ‘new society’ utopia points to important 
similarities in the system of ideas developed by those parties, with a strong emphasis on the 
ethnocentrist authoritarian and anti-egalitarian components expressed in what appears to be an 
essentially non-democratic ideological corpus 1. 
 
Whilst electorally irrelevant throughout the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the Flemish 
and French far right parties have since enjoyed increasing levels of electoral support and 
gradually managed to establish themselves as serious competitors against mainstream parties 
of the moderate right. This indisputable success in the polls has largely contributed to altering 
the balance of forces within their respective party system and posed unprecedented challenges 
to the traditional format of national politics in Flanders and France. Despite however the 
growth and stabilisation of their electoral support over time, both parties remain clearly 
identified with the far right by the vast majority of voters. They suffer from isolation on the 
margins of mainstream politics with very limited coalition potential and as of yet have failed, 
unlike their populist counterparts in Austria, Italy or the Netherlands, to enter the sphere of 
national government. 
 
 
1. The far right utopia in Belgium and France 
 
The ideology of the VB and the FN has significantly expanded over the years. Previous 
research has highlighted the role of political entrepreneurship and charismatic leadership 
amongst those parties. They often present versatile programmes and their highly centralised 
organisation allows them to respond quickly to emerging issues and exploit all critical 
political opportunities by dint of much ideological inconsistency (e.g. the ideological shift 
from free market to protectionism) (Betz & Immerfall, 1998). This probably partly explains 
why there is still much ‘definitional’ debate over the ideological nature of extreme right 
parties in Western Europe (Taggart, 1995; Griffin, 1996; Skenderovic, 2001; Ignazi, 2003). 
 
In order to express the essential nature of the Belgian and French far right weltanschauung, 
we prefer to draw on the conventional ideology analysis, in which concrete items are deduced 
from both implicit and explicit assumptions in party literature and party leaders’ speeches in 
the media. For the purposes of this analysis we have consulted party documents as well as 
                                                          
1
 With regard to the ideology of the Vlaams Blok and Front national, the first section of this chapter is an updated and 
amended version of Marc Swyngedouw & Gilles Ivaldi, 2001, “The extreme-right Utopia in Belgium and France. The 
ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok, the French Front National and the Belgian Front National”, West European Politics, 
Vol. (24), n°3, July, p.1-22. 
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interviews given to the press by key party figures. In the Belgian case the features of the VB 
ideological framework have been derived from documents such as ‘Principles of VB’ and the 
‘70 point programme for resolving the aliens problem’, the electoral propaganda used for the 
national elections in 1991 and 1995, and for the European and local elections of 1994. Further 
information about the ‘solidaristic people's community’ favoured by the VB has also been 
drawn from previous analyses made by Gijsels et al (1989), Gijsels (1992 and 1994) and 
Spruyt (1995). For the French case: The FN’s activist textbook, 1991; 50 proposals on 
immigration, 1991; 51 point programme for social policy, 1992; 300 proposals on social and 
economic policy, 1993; Contract with the French for the sake of France, 1995; For a French 
future, 2002). Similar themes are developed in Mégret's MNR manifestos: The Charter of 
MNR’s values, 1999; 50 proposals for restoring security, 1999; The national alternative: 
MNR’s priorities, 2002). It should also be remembered that the views and ideas to be explored 
are mainly those of hard-core party members and the leadership. The VB and FN voters are 
only familiar with a few of the most striking themes of those parties' propaganda: notably anti-
immigration and opposition to the traditional parties and their ‘corruption’ (Swyngedouw, 
2001; Perrineau, 2003). 
 
Here the emphasis is on those parties’ views of humanity, the world and the relationship 
between the individual and society. Using the definition suggested by Mannheim in Ideology 
and Utopia (1960), the extreme right ideology can be regarded as a developed system of ideas, 
whose utopian component is comprised in the refusal of the existing status quo. According to 
the utopian far right programme, the ultimate goal is to change the established power relations 
and governing rules in contemporary society. More specifically, the desire for a radical 
transformation of the socio-political system and the attack on the social-democratic consensus 
lie at the heart of the extreme right’s electoral appeal to ‘ordinary’ people (Swyngedouw, 1992 
& 2000; Hunter, 1997). The extreme right postulates a social order that never really existed 
and, in frustration over the alleged imperfections of real society, threatens to impose its utopia 
by force (Merkl and Weinberg, 1997). 
 
As shall be discussed in the second section of this chapter, such a structured system of beliefs 
and representations is a key element in understanding the rise and electoral stabilisation of the 
VB or the FN. Despite significant changes in patterns of party competition and/or co-
operation, the core ideological corpus of both organisations has proved very consistent over 
the years. In most cases, tactical adjustments have been restricted to polishing up the party’s 
political style and smoothing out the most radical elements of party ideology in order to 
increase its coalition potential. 
 
Thus, the change of name from Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang following the condemnation of 
the Vlaams Blok for ‘racism’ by Belgium’s High Appeal Court in November 2004 was 
nothing but an attempt to break the so-called cordon sanitaire built by mainstream parties as a 
rampart against the extreme right. In ideological terms, however, the programme of the newly 
formed Vlaams Belang was clearly the continuation of the corpus of the former VB in an 
updated and softened format aimed at preventing future legal convictions on grounds for 
‘racism’. Such a surface ideological ‘aggiornamento’ would help increase the party’s 
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acceptability as coalition partner for centre-right CD&V Christian Democrats or VLD Liberals 
in Flanders 2. 
 
Similarly, the 1999 split in the French FN –which led to the departure of Bruno Mégret and 
his allies, and to the creation of a new Mouvement national Républicain (MNR)– had no clear 
implications for the ideological direction of the two resultant parties. Indeed the comparative 
analysis of party ideology shows a high degree of convergence between the political 
manifestos presented by the FN and rival MNR. The similarities in the programmes by the FN 
and MNR can hardly be considered a surprise given the major contribution by Mégret as then 
FN General Delegate (1988-1999) and former members of the Club de l’Horloge in defining 
the broad lines of the FN’s ideology around some of the classic national-populist themes. The 
dispute between Le Pen and Mégret was not a fight over the ideological stance of the 
movement but rather the climax of a longstanding power-struggle which opposed some of the 
pragmatic and issue-oriented cadre elements of the party to the old orthodox radical guard 
(Ivaldi, 1999). 
 
a) Portrayal of Humanity 
The portrayal of humanity is the expression of the nature of humanity and its essential 
characteristics within a given ideology. 
 
The cultural and racial community 
In the VB and FN’s ideology, humanity is often regarded as consisting of groups, or more 
precisely, of in-and-outgroups. In this ethnocentrist view, the former refer to groups to which 
the individual supposedly belongs whereas the latter include all the people who are perceived 
as intrinsically different because of their ethnic origin, religion or culture. Essentially, argue 
both parties, people are not the same and shouldn’t be considered equivalent. The most usual 
distinction between people is made on the basis of their cultural background or ethnicity. 
Given the anti-racist and anti-fascist taboo which was established in the aftermath of WWII, 
and because of existing anti-racist laws in both countries, overt racist statements based on 
pure biological (racial) or genetic criteria of differentiation were relinquished from the 
ideological corpus of the far right, although such arguments are plainly suggested in both 
parties’ approach to immigration and integration issues. 
 
The theoretical framework for cultural racism in the FN was originally set up by the French 
New Right in the late 1970s. The ‘egalitarian neo-racism’ was first conceived as an attempt to 
put the emphasis on cultural differences and incompatibility of mores between Europeans and 
non-European foreigners. The use of the egalitarian repertoire of the left was considered a 
means of avoiding being sued under an accusation of racism. In the 1990s, however, overt 
                                                          
2
 On November 9, 2004 the Vlaams Blok was condemned for racism by the Belgium’s High Appeal Court (Hof van Cassatie) 
which followed the argumentation by the 'Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism' stating that the party 
was guilty of voicing regular and systematic racist opinions. The conviction came as the end of about 10 years of juridical 
battle. Soon after the verdict, the VB national leadership held a congress to create a 'new' party under the banner of Vlaams 
Belang (Flemish Interest) which was presented as the simple continuation of the Vlaams Blok, mainly in order to secure 
public funding. Despite claims by party leader Van Hecke that the original party Principles would still be a valid reference, a 
new shorter and updated version of the programme was issued on the basis of the Principles, which took great care in leaving 
aside some of the most controversial statements such as, for instance, previous overt support by the VB to the Apartheid 
regime in South-Africa and some blatant breaches of the ECHR. 
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racist and biologically-based statements resurfaced, mainly as a consequence of the tough 
stance on immigration taken by the traditional parties of the right (Ivaldi, 2003). According to 
Bernard Antony, leader of the traditionalist Catholics, ‘our country is losing its intellectual, 
moral and biological substance. France is diminished, invaded, occupied and degraded’ (Le 
Monde, 18-19 February 1996). The distinction that the FN makes between the French and the 
non-European foreigners implies a hierarchical dichotomy, not only in terms of the traditional 
opposition between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarity’ (Le Pen in Le Monde, 4 September 1993), 
but also with regard to the ‘capacities’ or ‘performances’ of ‘Whites’ and ‘Blacks’ 
comparatively (Le Pen in Libération, 31 August- 1st September 1996). 
 
In Belgium, the VB leadership rarely ventures to make such a distinction on a purely 
biological basis. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘fundamental natural inequality between 
communities’ expressed in the Principles 3 implies an ethnic hierarchy in which the Fleming 
stands at the top, with Dutchmen and Afrikaners (South Africa) immediately below them, as 
members of the same ‘people’, sharing a similar language and, according to VB, also sharing 
a common culture. Next down the hierarchy, and still more or less equal, are the assimilated 
(French speaking) Flemings of Brussels, the Walloon area and French Flanders (an area in the 
North of France). These people live, according to the VB, in ‘occupied territory’. These 
groups are followed by the European foreigners which are said to have the same racial origins 
(white), but are culturally divergent, although they share a common European heritage and 
civilisation. At the bottom of this community scale come the non-European foreigners, who 
share neither the language, culture and territory, nor the ethnic background of the Flemings. 
 
The ‘ethnically committed’ vanguard 
The building of social categories within the ethnocentrist ideological framework does not 
restrict itself to creating in-and-outgroups on a cultural basis. In cognitive terms, ideology can 
be conceived as a mean of organising and selecting information from the social environment 
and thus easing the task of dealing with the complexity of the world. This is particularly true 
in the case of the far right parties regarding the way in which they aim to provide their 
supporters with a simplified grid for the analysis of society. Even within ingroups, the far right 
makes clear distinctions between individuals. In particular, there are the so-called ‘ethnically 
committed’ and ‘not-ethnically committed’ people (VB), or the ‘national’ versus the ‘anti-
national’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ individuals (FN). Unlike the latter, the nationally committed 
possess higher moral values ‘necessary for creating a counterweight to human egoism’, such 
as a perception of responsibility, self-sacrifice, social justice, solidarity, tolerance and 
brotherly love. Their attitude towards life arises from the perception of the ‘necessary 
solidarity of all with all in the community’ (VB Principles). 
 
The nationally committed individuals are part of an elite, which is capable of abnegation and 
for this reason has a say in society. According to Gollnisch, Delegate General of the FN, “the 
worst is coming. This might lead to the sacrifice of our belongings, our freedom, even perhaps 
of our own lives. Together with Jean-Marie Le Pen, we are the leaders of the heroic and 
fanatic phalanx, we are the passionate, the determined, the inflexible ones. We must be the 
                                                          
3
 Here we still purposely refer to the earlier version(s) of the documents published by the Vlaams Blok prior to the change 
over to Vlaams Belang. As stated above, there was very little change to the party’s actual ideological corpus and the new 
programme was mostly a fashioning up of previous party literature in order to open a breach in the general agreement among 
mainstream parties not to enter into coalition with the extreme right. 
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leaders that the people are waiting for” (Libération, 1st September 1996). In contrast to the 
nationally committed vanguard are the masses, which must be shown the right path and 
protected against evil influences and the general blurring of moral standards (VB Principles; 
Taguieff, 1989 on the FN). The masses must be taught self-discipline from childhood onward. 
The distinction between the nationally committed elite and the masses who must be protected 
against the temptation of degenerated modern society, assumes that, with the exception of the 
former group, humanity is essentially weak, although ‘capable of sensing the mortal threat 
which weighs on its future’. The enlightened vanguard, i.e. the far right party, must therefore 
‘lead the popular uprising which will free the country from decadence’ (Le Pen in Libération, 
15 July 1996). 
 
Fundamental inequality 
Not only is the principle of natural inequality inherent in the existing differences between 
social groups, but also it refers to fundamental differences between the individuals within a 
particular group. According to the ‘aristocratic idea’ of the far-right, it is after all ‘impossible 
to ignore the natural inequality and (individual) variety of the individual’ (VB Principles). 
Egalitarianism is intrinsically wrong in that it goes against the rule of nature: ‘the principle of 
equality is fundamentally unfair to the most capable ones’ (Le Pen, quoted by Taguieff, 
1989:179). The task of the ‘spiritual elite’ is to ensure that ‘levelling is countered in order to 
prevent the decline of the community among the masses’ (VB Principles). To quote Maurras, 
leader of the French Action Française, people have to choose ‘between inequality and decay, 
between inequality and anarchy, between inequality and death’ (Maurras, 1924:119). 
 
Equally important to the VB and FN portrayal of humanity is the notion of 'working 
humanity'. This relates closely to the above principle of basic inequality between individuals 
within the same society. For the far-right there is no right to laziness and no homo ludens. 
Service is a duty which is determined by each individual’s position or role within the natural 
community. Rights can only be acquired through productive work and individuals must be 
primarily fed with a feeling of responsibility to the community. This duty to work can also be 
performed in non-economic spheres. Women, for example, should for preference work in the 
family, where they should play their role as mothers by providing children with necessary 
care, education and homely warmth. This concept implies an inequality between men and 
women, by assigning the personal fulfilment of men and women to production and 
reproduction respectively. 
 
 
b) World View 
The world view or social vision implies a more or less coherent set of views relating to the 
principles by which the cohabitation of individuals and groups is ordered and develops.  
 
The Gemeinschaft utopia 
The utopian picture offered by the FN and the VB is predominantly one of an organic 
community whose pillars are to be found in the long-standing traditional values that are said 
to have shaped the whole society throughout its formation. Such an utopia fits into a category 
of ‘conservatism’ or ‘traditio-communitarianism’ (Taguieff, 1989:175). The concept of 
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‘nature’, as defined historically by the counter-revolutionary intellectuals of the nineteenth 
century, lies in a set of holistic values –family, religion, homeland, work, duty– all of which 
subordinate the individual to the group. 
 
The VB solidarism aims to build a hierarchically structured community of ethnically 
committed people. The utopian society sketched by the Principles and other official texts of 
the VB, can be directly traced to what Tönnies, writing in 1887, described as the 
Gemeinschaft (Swyngedouw, 1995a). Admittedly the VB utopia is based on the modern 
economic and social structures of the 1950s and 1960s, but nonetheless draws on the natural 
community that Tönnies linked to traditional household economy. It is a society in which no 
strife exists and with a fixed distinction between good and evil. Within the FN ideological 
corpus, the Gemeinschaft utopia is defined in terms of a ‘conservative revolution’. The 
concept was brought to the party in the mid 1980s when the FN was seeking new alliances 
among the various components of the French extreme right-wing and found partners among 
the traditionalist Catholics and some members of the Club de l’Horloge (Ivaldi, 1998b). The 
FN ideal-type of society is also deeply rooted in the experience of decolonization in Algeria or 
the longstanding fascination for the Conservative Revolution implemented by the Vichy 
regime in 1940-44. When commanding to obey the immutable law of nature, the FN model of 
conservative revolution places the emphasis on organic and hierarchical values which are very 
similar to those propagated by the VB solidarism. 
 
For the VB and FN the family is the basic unit of this harmonious and organically structured 
community. According to Le Pen, ‘family is the supreme truth and a biological reality’ 
(quoted by Taguieff, 1989:215). Families can only consist of married heterosexual couples 
whose duty is to have children in order to maintain and strengthen the community. For the 
VB, an average of two-point-one children is considered an absolute minimum in order to keep 
the population up. Part of the educational task of the family is to instil national commitment in 
the children. In a very similar vein, the FN calls for the implementation of an effective family 
policy which is seen as the only means of increasing the birth-rate nationwide in the face of 
what the party propaganda describes as the ‘winter of demography’ caused by contraception 
and abortion. The FN political agenda includes therefore measures in favour of large families, 
such as the introduction of social benefits for couples with three children or more, as well as a 
basic wage and pension income for housewives (For a French future, 2002). 
 
Undoubtedly, the state has a role to play in the defence of traditional values. As conceived by 
the far right, the state must protect the cultural and spiritual interests of the ethnic community 
from loose morals and degeneration. Soft-drug use, homosexuality, miscegenation, abortion, 
the use of the morning after pill, IUDs, sex outside marriage, the use of condoms to prevent 
infection by AIDS: all are harmful to the moral, cultural and spiritual standards of the ethnic 
community. To quote a former member of the FN political bureau, ‘we are now witnessing the 
implosion of the White world caused by the growth of delinquency and crime (that is 
barbarity). Agents of death are drugs, AIDS and abortion, all encouraged by permissive laws’ 
(Présent, 7-8 November 1992). The VB and FN reject any liberalisation of the law on 
marriage and abortion. The FN has also established working parties such as the CNFE or 
Fraternité française. These campaigning groups, with their value goals like family, abortion, 
religion or poverty, are active over the whole range of FN policy. They organise single-issue 
campaigns within their own field of social concern. With a claimed membership of 5,000, the 
Cercle national femmes d'Europe (CNFE), led by Martine Lehideux, is a women's 
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organisation involved in the promotion of traditional family values. The FN is also linked to 
various anti-abortion and so-called 'rights of the child' groups such as Laissez-les vivre or 
SOS-Tout-Petits, which in the past resorted to illegal methods and were involved in violent 
action against hospitals and physicians who legally carry out abortions. Direct action groups 
have thus emerged alongside moderate anti-abortion associations; one example being the FN-
affiliated Cercle Renaissance. 
 
According to Le Pen, the decrease in the birth-rate is ‘a consequence of stress, alcohol and 
tobacco, which reduce the vitality of men’s spermatozoids. It is also a consequence of the so-
called women liberation (...) The generalised use of contraceptive pills and the French law on 
abortion are far more efficient than any nuclear bomb in eradicating our people from the 
surface of planet earth’ (Contract with the French for the sake of France, 1995). ‘Divorce 
should be made more difficult’, wrote a VB parliamentarian in the newspaper (Gazet van 
Antwerpen, 29 November 1995). ‘As divorce becomes easier, the number of homosexuals in 
our society increases’. The ‘loosening of morals’ in our society is largely the fault of the 
media, specifically through the ‘abuse of mass communication media, through which such 
moral decay is propagated’ (Principles). The 2002 FN manifesto similarly called for a better 
recognition of marriage and the abrogation of the Civil Wedding Contract (PACS) voted in 
October 1999 under the Socialist Government of Lionel Jospin. 
 
In many respect, the ordered community is only possible where public authority is effectively 
endorsed with power through the classic model of Etat-gendarme and a significant increase in 
strength and resources for law-enforcement authorities. For the VB, individuals ‘with an 
exaggerated social conscience must be weeded out of the police forces and the judiciary’. 
Citizens must also watch over social order and discipline. The FN project for a Sixth Republic 
calls for a more repressive penal system whose central element would be the reintroduction of 
death penalty and the general principle of “swift and certain prison sentences without any 
possibility of remittance whatsoever” (For a French future, 2002). According to the VB, 
neighbourhood watch committees should pass information onto the police about suspicious 
individuals’ behaviour in their local area. Vigilante committees should be given the right to 
patrol around their own districts –albeit unarmed. Moreover, every person suspected of an 
offence, even if under the age of 18, such as shoplifting or petty vandalism, should be 
remanded on bail. Illegally gathered evidence must, according to the VB, be admissible in 
criminal cases hearing in Courts. Jail sentences must be served in full, without probation or 
remittance in return for good behaviour. Hardened criminals must be ‘permanently removed’ 
from society. 
 
 
Solidarism, social conflict and the Third Way 
The world view of the FN and the VB aims to deal with the organisation of society and the 
cohabitation of groups within the idealised community. We shall examine in the last section 
how the far right conceives social justice when it comes to defining principles of coexistence 
between the ethnically homogeneous ingroup and the various outgroups. Of equal relevance to 
the present analysis is the way in which the FN and VB claim to regulate conflict between 
social groups, classes or individuals. 
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The social views of VB are drawn directly from the authoritarian theories of the 1930s and are 
referred to as ‘Solidarism’. From an historical perspective, contemporary solidarism is linked 
to Mussolini’s corporatism which aimed to bring a sense of solidarity between capitalists and 
workers in order to pursue the joint interests of the people and the state. The Flemish variant 
of solidarism was developed in the 1930s by Verdinaso (het Verbond van Dietse NAtionaal-
SOlidaristen) and the VNV (Vlaams-Nationalistisch Verbond), which both collaborated with 
the Nazis during WWII. Verdinaso was a paramilitary, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic 
movement which stood for a corporatist solidarity and strongly rejected multipartism and the 
parliamentary system. The VNV, founded in 1933, and at that time the main Flemish 
Nationalist party, similarly opted for a variant of authoritarian solidarism (De Wever, 1992), 
opposing economic liberalism and marxism in order to ‘restore the feeling of community 
amongst all social classes within the nation’ (Gijsels, 1992:25). In the 2004 version of the 
Vlaams Belang Principles, no reference was made anymore to Solidarism. However, the 
preparatory texts for the Vlaams Belang party congress on economics (June 2005) was clearly 
inspired by the basic ideas of Solidarism (see for example the role of trade unions in society 
according to Vlaams Belang, which is very similar to that described in the previous Vlaams 
Blok Solidarist programme). 
 
The ideological inheritance from Verdinaso and the VNV has nourished the claim by the VB 
that everyone who ‘truly experiences the natural ethnic commitment’ will reject the class 
system and the class struggle in favour of solidarity between employers and employees of all 
occupations (Principles). The VB defines solidarism as a third way between exploitative and 
alienating capitalism in free-market liberal economics and the coercive communist systems. 
According to Dewinter, ‘the VB owes its victory to the fact that it puts forward a few new 
problems that do not fit the ideological canvas of the traditional parties (...) The old axis 
‘capital versus labour’ is slowly but definitely replaced by a new ‘multicultural versus national 
[volkse] identity’ axis (quoted by Mudde, 1996:243). 
 
Turning to the FN, it is interesting to note that the Solidariste movement quickly constituted 
itself a major component of the national leadership through Stirbois’s Union Solidariste which 
joined the party in the late 1970s. In the mid 1980s, the FN accompanied its strategy of 
internal moderation with the promotion of neo-liberal economic views and free-market 
principles against the ‘third way’ option which was supported by Stirbois. In 1993, the 300 
proposals on social and economic policy included the traditional corporatist theme of 
solidarity. According to the FN programme, ‘a company should not be the locus of a struggle 
between employers and workers (...) but an authentic working community in which everybody 
would have their own role according to their situation within the hierarchical structure’. 
Following the presidential election of 1995, the FN opted unambiguously for the traditional 
‘neither left, nor right’ formula suggested by the young activists of the FNJ (Le Monde, 26 
September 1995). ‘Our movement now wants to overcome the old cleavage between the so-
called right and the archaic left in order to unify the whole people of France’, said Le Pen (Le 
Monde, 12 February 1996). It was clearly stated that the aim of the party was to integrate the 
proletariat and, more generally, all the socially deprived groups to the national community by 
promoting new forms of solidarity which would not be based on social class anymore, but 
rather on a ‘pro/anti-national cleavage’ (Le Monde, 18-19 February 1996). 
 
In economics, the VB and FN traditionally stood for a sort of neo-liberalism which wouldn’t 
harm the interests of the people's community. The adherence to free-market and laissez-faire 
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principles, along with a set of populist themes regarding the distribution of services by the 
welfare state, enabled the far right parties to gain electoral support from both the working 
class and the petty-bourgeoisie (Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Evans, 2003). Interestingly, the 
political programme of the far right can be regarded as ‘a mix, often magnificent and 
fallacious, of private initiative and social protection (but limited to the native)’ (Ignazi, 
1996:560). 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the economic project of the FN was one of ‘popular capitalism based 
on property, responsibility and entrenchment’ (Militer au Front, 1991) directed at the 
predominant petty-bourgeois component of its electorate, with values such as private 
initiative, freedom, individual merit and sense of effort lying at the heart of the FN’s refusal of 
any intervention by the state that might be an obstacle to ‘natural’ market laws. A significant 
shift occurred in party ideology in the mid-1990s, mainly as a consequence of the 
strengthening of the solidarist current within the top-level party leadership and the substantial 
increase in the FN’s electoral support among working-class and former leftist voters. This led 
to a mixed economic platform, combining anti-tax liberalism and national protectionism 
against globalisation, the United States, the European Union and free trade. The 1995 electoral 
platform thus added new themes of social protection, in particular regarding the RMI 
(minimum wage for the most socially deprived individuals) whose benefit should be restricted 
to the French citizens, with the FN putting more emphasis on the defence of the social rights 
of ‘workers’ and socially deprived individuals and violently condemning the ‘anonymous and 
vagabond capitalism of the multinational Masonic companies which want to rule the world’ 
(Le Pen in Le Monde, 3 May 1996). 
 
This socio-economic ‘synthesis’ was well publicised by Le Pen in the 2002 presidential 
election campaign where the FN’s leader would at every possible opportunity define himself 
as “socially left-wing, economically right-wing and nationally French”. Simultaneously, the 
2002 party manifesto included a wide range of heterogeneous and unrealistic proposals from 
tax cuts to national social protectionism and fierce hostility to free trade and globalisation 
along with the out of hand rejection of the European Union, the EMU and all constraints 
imposed by the so-called Brussels’ 'Eurocracy'. In April 2000, the FN national party congress 
voted a motion for opting out of both the EU and EMU. In 2005, the FN strongly opposed the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and called for a No vote in the May referendum. 
To quote Le Pen, the EU “is not a power but rather a US protectorate and a big soft jellyfish 
incapable of self-defence” (Europe-1, 10 May 2005). Together with the anti-EU component, 
anti-US stances and the FN rejection of the “new world order imposed by America” became 
evident in the early 1990s with the FN opposing the first war in Irak and Le Pen publicly 
supporting Saddam Hussein on location in Baghdad after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi 
troops. In 2003, the far right leader condemned the US intervention in Iraq as a “war of 
arrogance and predation” (February 2003). 
 
As far as the VB is concerned, the socio-economic model chosen was clearly one of harmony 
within a homogenous ethnic group, in which there are no conflicting interests between 
component groups. That ‘the individual's duty is to take the initiative’ has certain logical 
implications for the VB’s view of society. While the party largely acknowledges the virtues of 
free-market economy, concerns are expressed about the ‘weaker, those disadvantaged by 
nature or misfortune, or the handicapped’ who should not be made ‘the victims of lesser 
chances and opportunities’ (Principles). The unemployed should receive public benefits only 
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if they perform a (compulsory) service. The Vlaams Blok has a somewhat contradictory 
argument for a strong Europe of ‘European peoples’. On the one hand, the party wants a 
strong and powerful Europe to act on the international stage, capable of speaking and acting as 
one. Characteristic of this thinking is the call for a fully developed European defence system 
(an European army being considered a necessity for the future to face the threat embodied by 
Islamic countries), as well as uniform and stringent policies towards immigration and asylum 
seekers. On the other hand, however, the party loudly objects to the asphyxiating centralism of 
Europe, where the European structure is viewed as a breach of the inalienable right of a people 
to determine its own fate. As a result the attitude to the European Union is in general highly 
ambivalent: greater integration of free market economy, foreign policy, defence, immigration, 
crime fighting, and environmental policies, combined with a powerful plea for less or even no 
intervention in national matters such as the arts, education, law and order and social security 
(Swyngedouw, Abts & Van Craen, 2005a). Although economically liberal in the internal 
market, the EU should implement protectionist measures to protect all member states from 
imports from non-EU countries. Like its French counterpart, the VB strongly attacks the 
European administration and the so-called Brussels’ ‘Eurocrats’. 
 
The role of the existing unions of workers is questioned by the far right. According to the VB, 
workers should identify themselves with the companies, so that the distinction between 
management and workers would progressively blur and eventually disappear. Unions should 
be replaced by joint committees in the workplace, which would pursue the company’s best 
interests. Workers would have some say in company management, but only on matters in 
which they might have knowledge and expertise. Apart from the minimum legal wage 
guaranteed by the state, wages and salaries would be dependent on the actual company’s 
performances and results. Another task for the unions (referred to as ‘professional 
associations’ by the VB’s literature) would consist of helping to develop vocational training in 
their members. In spite of this, the suppression of trade unions would undoubtedly better fulfil 
the VB's desire to get rid of unnecessary intermediate social organisation such as unions and 
mutual health insurance bodies which stand between the people and the state and are criticised 
for pursuing solely their own interests. A similar view emerges from the FN proposals 
regarding the regulation of social conflict within companies, although the party conception of 
the role of the existing unions, and the need for suppressing their rights, is far from 
unambiguous. Primarily denounced by Le Pen’s party is the ‘unacceptable privilege’ from 
which both the unions and the civil servants benefit within French society, the former also 
being accused of political involvement with the parties of the left. The FN asks for more 
‘efficiency’ and ‘commitment’ on the part of civil servants and proposes to decrease the total 
number of people employed by the state. Turning to the unions, the existing organisations of 
workers and employees are rejected because of their ‘inefficiency to ensure that the people’s 
rights are truly respected’ (For a French future, 2002). 
 
Both parties consider that current national laws on strikes should be amended. According to 
the VB, strikes without preliminary notice should be prohibited and those willing to work 
should retain the right to do so during strikes. More importantly, the unions would be liable 
for financial loss caused to third parties. It could be argued from these policies that the VB 
does not recognise the right to organise. The party's proposals would totally undermine 
workers' basic rights and thus spell the end of the European industrial consultative model long 
established in Belgium. Arguably, the FN stance on strikes is fairly similar: the 2002 
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manifesto states for instance that “freedom of work will be re-established by legally banning 
strike pickets”. 
 
Anti-partyism and political action 
In examining the FN and VB world views, one needs to consider how political actors outside 
the mainstream develop structured representations of the political groups they oppose within 
civil democracy. As outlined by many scholars, a key feature of the far right strategy lies with 
the building of the concept of ‘political class’ or ‘political establishment’, which embraces all 
the other parties and tends to undermine differences between them (Swyngeouw, 1992; 
Schedler, 1996). Anti-partyism thus provides a cognitive map of the whole political universe 
as a dichotomy, along with a populist appeal to the ‘man on the street’ against political elites. 
The far right propaganda refers constantly to what it describes as the corruption and 
unreliability of all existing political parties. Politicians are said to be interested solely in 
‘filling their own pockets’ and favouring their supporters at the expenses of the ordinary man. 
 
In the case of the FN, the above process of “de-differentiation” was more than evident from 
the past recurrent attacks on the ‘bande des quatre’ (referring to the PC, PS, UDF and RPR) 
and the constant attempts at blurring differences between the main parties of the left and the 
right. In 2002, the far right campaign was based on denouncing the joint failure and collusive 
strategies of the parties of the mainstream during the five years of cohabitation, with repeated 
attacks on ‘Josrac and Chipin’ (referring to Prime Minister Jospin and President Chirac, and 
mixing purposely their names). The FN’s picture of French politics is predominantly one of 
corruption, decay and increased party privilege. Although the FN leadership never questions 
overtly the legitimacy of representative democracy, it would be fair to say that anti-system 
attitudes promoted by the far right go far beyond simple attacks on corruption and 
undoubtedly contain some elements of a real anti-democratic programme. To quote Le Pen, 
‘the Fifth Republic is a mad cow with AIDS. French politics stink; there is impotency and 
corruption everywhere (...) We are faced with this massive epidemic [corruption], which 
commands that we eliminate the whole herd’ (Libération, 15 July 1996). According to 
Gollnisch: “when the political regime is rotten, a crisis is salutary. Politicians get lost! Push 
off!” (FN national committee, 7 April 2005). 
 
In the FN, anti-partyism goes alongside with political anti-Semitism and the traditional far 
right theory of plots and manipulation. In the FN’s view of politics, the established parties, in 
particular those of the right, are depicted as subordinate to the influence of highly 
manipulative organisations, either Jewish or Masonic. For instance, the RPR’s refusal to ally 
with the FN in 1995 was seen as the evidence that the ‘Masonic’ leaders of the gaullist 
movement ‘were constrained by all those obscure forces which aim to rule our country against 
the interests of its people’ (Le Pen in Le Monde, 7 June 1995). Over the years, anti-Semitism 
and revisionism have become recurrent features of the FN’s political discourse: as early as 
1987, Le Pen had paved the way to the many attempts at questioning overtly the reality of the 
Holocaust by regarding the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the existence of gas chambers as 
mere ‘details’ in the whole history of WWII (RTL, 13 September 1987). More recently, 
Gollnisch was expelled from the University of Lyon after his public statement that 
“concentration camps did exist but historians could further discuss the number of those who 
were killed”. “As for the existence of gas chambers, it is up to historians to decide” added Le 
Pen’s first lieutenant (Libération, 12 October 2004). 
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Similar features of anti-partyism and anti-political establishment attitudes can be drawn from 
the ideological corpus of the Belgian far right and the way in which party politics is described 
as ‘political gangsterism’. The VB Principles do not reject the multiparty system, free 
expression, and parliamentary democracy but the message is clear. ‘The VB is not a ‘colour’ 
party (like the Social Democrats (SP), the liberals (VLD) and the democratic Flemish 
Nationalists (VU)) or an ‘established’ party (like the Christian Democrats (CD&V)) prepared 
to compromise and bargain, always driven by the perspective of the next election’. Both 
‘colour’ and ‘established’ parties squander the real interests of the people and the VB claims 
to be ‘essentially different from those communities of interests embodied by the colour 
parties’. The VB demands ‘effective measures to upgrade political life and parliamentary 
activity, and fights against the mixing of politics and financial interests’. As explained in the 
Principles, ‘politics must be withdrawn from the atmosphere of small-mindedness, cliques, 
and calculation in which it has currently been marooned by democracy and the malady of 
parliamentarism’. In other words, the world view of the VB leaves very little room for 
political parties which propagate misleading theories and politics should be rescued by 
suppressing democracy and closing parliament. Interestingly, the new version of the Vlaams 
Belang Principles contains a paragraph on the acceptance of democracy and recognition of the 
fundamental rights referred to in the ECHR. The reason for this is to be found in the new 
Belgian law on party financing which requires such explicit quotes and references in order for 
a particular party to be able to get subsidies from the Federal state. In the case of the VB, these 
were introduced just after the new law was implemented some years ago. 
 
Overall, modern society is in decline because of crime, moral decay and narrow self-interest. 
Action needs therefore to be undertaken in order to prevent society from falling into pieces. 
The VB considers three ways in which this decline can be reversed. First of all there is the 
parliamentary route. In Parliament the VB can act as a pressure party, which by its presence 
and influence on public opinion can force other parties to tighten their position (e.g. on 
immigration or law-and-order). Secondly, the VB is expecting the new Flemish political elite 
to push for the independence of Flanders, even against the will of the majority of Flemish 
voters. Finally the party must work to overcome the current ideological and cultural hegemony 
in education, journalism and culture, which according to the VB is in the hands of left-wing 
‘soixante-huitards’ (Knack, 14 June 1995). As explained by Dewinter: ‘no political change is 
possible if not preceded by cultural and social change’ (quoted by Spruyt, 1995:166). 
 
Menace to the community: immigration issues in the far right world view 
Not only is the urge for action a consequence of the decay of traditional politics, but also it is 
justified by the danger represented by foreign populations and their deleterious impact on the 
life and essence of the community. The rise of the far right movements in the mid 1980s was 
closely related to the emergence of immigrants and asylum-seekers issues in Western Europe. 
Part of the explanation for the electoral success of parties such as the VB and the FN lies with 
the politicisation of the immigration issue, but also with those parties’ ability to redraw the 
social environment, constructing –by reducing immigrants’ symbolic, cultural and economic 
capital– the non-European foreigners as threatening groups (Swyngedouw, 1995b). 
 
The ideological construction of the immigrants as an homogenous and threatening social actor 
is obvious in the FN propaganda, particularly regarding North-African people. For instance, 
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Le Pen denounces the ‘undesirable immigrants who lead the French Social Security to 
bankruptcy, who colonise our cities and villages, who overcrowd our prisons, who rape and 
kill’ (Le Monde, 23-24 June 1996). For the FN leader, “immigration creates all conditions for 
social disintegration” (RMC-Info, 25 April 2002). One key argument of the FN is that the 
culture and religion of the immigrants is irreconcilable with the European culture of which the 
French tradition forms part. In particular, Islam is considered a major threat to the French 
civilisation and described “not only as a simple set of beliefs but also a religious and political 
theocracy” (For a French future, 2002). Fitting into a very similar scheme, the ‘massive’ 
presence of foreigners in Flanders is identified by the VB propaganda as the root cause of 
moral decay. ‘The presence of numerous immigrants is slowly but definitively changing our 
world. Their presence changes the appearance of the streets, leads to an increase in criminality 
and the growth of unemployment’ (70 point programme). According to the VB, Islam is 
diametrically opposed to established western rights such as freedom of expression, 
democracy, woman emancipation, and the separation between the Church and the State. 
 
Not surprisingly, both far right parties reject the integration of non-European foreigners, and 
pledge for a phased return to their countries of origin. In the context of post-industrial 
societies faced with increasing rates of unemployment, housing problems and the crisis of the 
welfare state, the exclusion of immigrants is justified not only by cultural arguments but also 
by economic reasons (Hargreaves & Leaman, 1995; Swyngedouw, 1995b). In both cases, ‘the 
xenophobic discourse (...) is an element in a political struggle about who deserves the right to 
be cared for by the state and society : a fight for the collective goods of the state’ (Wimmer, 
1997:32). 
 
The VB 70 point programme states a number of policy aims with regard to immigration 
issues. Interestingly enough, the above programme was largely adopted by the French Front 
National in its 50 proposals on immigration (1991) and subsequently formed part of the 1995 
and 2002 party manifestos. One striking aspect of these documents concerns the numerous 
breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that they contain. As noted 
earlier, the most extreme features have been since removed from the newly created Vlaams 
Belang’s party programme under the threat of possible conviction for racism. The playing 
down on immigration issues actually started in 2001 with some of the controversial and 
potentially ECHR incompatible proposals being left aside or re-formulated in an attempt to 
appear as more moderate and, therefore, more acceptable for coalition. Overall, the basic 
principle is now one opposing full assimilation to departure from the host country (aanpassen 
of opkrassen). According to Philip Dewinter, however, the fact is that the core VB perception 
of immigration hasn’t changed beyond surface moderation. “Multiculturalism has lead to 
multicriminality (…) Islamite organisations must be watched closely. The minor sing of 
unsuited or deviant behaviour must lead to their withdrawal (…) Who are those moderated 
Muslims? I do not know them. I do not believe in them”, said recently the VB leader to the 
Dutch newspaper Metro (14 May 2005). 
 
Both parties threaten extreme measures against immigrants and question some of the 
fundamental rights of foreigners. According to the VB, freedom of association would be 
restricted for immigrants, as would the basic right of families to be united through legislation 
on family entry and settlement. The right to hold property would be limited for foreigners 
within a probationary period of ten years. Also contrary to some of the fundamental principles 
contained in the ECHR, the VB proposals call for the collective deportation of foreigners and 
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would allow for ethnic discrimination through separate educational and social security 
systems, limitation on child allowances for foreign couples with a maximum of three children 
(Belgians having an unlimited right to child allowance regardless of the number of children), 
limitations on unemployment benefits compared to that received by the Belgians, and the 
introduction of a tax on companies resorting to foreign workers. All these proposals are 
subordinate to the principle of ‘Our People First’, the VB slogan which is the concise but 
effective expression of both the VB and the FN policies. 
 
Indeed, the very similar concept of ‘priority to the French citizens’ (Préférence nationale), 
keystone to the FN’s immigration policy, states that the French should always benefit first 
from all subsidies of the national Welfare State. The 2002 party manifesto included a series of 
measures that would give priority to French citizens in getting jobs and being protected from 
redundancy, as well as priority in access to public housing or securing property loans. All state 
benefits such as family allowances, unemployment benefits or the minimum social wage 
(RMI) would be exclusively intended for the French. The programme claims that the FN 
would put an end to legal immigration and abrogate existing legislation on family entry and 
settlement while deporting all illegal immigrants to their country of origin, suppressing 
renewable resident’s permits and expelling every foreigner subjected to a conviction by 
French Courts. The very few who would be granted asylum ‘will be invited to abstain from all 
political activism’. To obtain French citizenship, candidates would have to demonstrate that 
they are fully ‘assimilated’ into and ‘committed’ to the national community. Citizenship 
would only be granted after a ‘long period of probation’ during which candidates would have 
to abstain from all political activities. All ‘ethnic ghettos’ in suburban areas would be 
‘dismantled and the existing housing facilities renovated for priority attribution to French 
citizens’. Foreign associations would be put under strict scrutiny by the French administration 
(For a French future, 2002). The VB would also impose strict conditions on naturalisation 
and applications for citizenship (70 point programme): applicants would have to be at least 
20, have had their main place of residence in the country for at least 10 years, speak the 
language of the community, be of ‘good moral conduct’ (i.e. not have been subjected to any 
conviction) and offer special services or skills to the host country. Such criteria would 
substantially reduce the list of eligible people, certainly excluding Moroccan or Turkish 
immigrants in Flanders. In the 1990s, both the FN and the VB programmes included a very 
controversial proposal to ‘review’ all naturalisations that took place since 1974, the year in 
which restrictions on immigration were introduced in Belgium and France. In the new version 
of its programme, the Vlaams Belang claims to restrict the right to citizenship exclusively to 
immigrants who can be seen as ‘fully assimilated’ (Vlaams Belang, 2004 programme). 
Similarly, whilst a key measure in the 1991 FN document on immigration policy, that specific 
measure was taken out of the 2002 party programme. 
 
 
c) Nation, lineage: the relationship between the individual and society 
The relationship between the individual and society is the keystone to every ideology. Central 
to this question is whether the individual is subject or otherwise to the collective interests of 
society? As mentioned previously, the portrayal of humanity depicted by the FN and the VB 
goes together with a holistic conception of society. With respect to the relationship between 
the individual and the group, it is clear from the ideological corpus of both parties that the 
ethnic community takes absolute precedence over individuals, as people are essentially 
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regarded as ‘social animals’. Individuals have no existence of their own, from which they 
could draw universal rights; on the contrary they are intrinsically and inseparably associated 
with their particular community through the basic family social unit. Ethnic commitment is 
not a voluntary engagement, but rather a natural innate link. Essentially, says the FN, men and 
women are heirs to the tradition, the culture and values of the nation to which they belong. 
Their duty is to preserve and transmit such inheritance. In contrast, individualistic principles 
are considered pure theoretical abstractions in opposition to the reality that bounds individuals 
to their lineage: as quoted in the 2002 manifesto “the nation is not built on social contract but 
is the fruit of an order”. Individual rights therefore exist only insofar as deriving from the 
performance of duty within the ethnic community. For the VB, such a sense of duty and 
commitment includes also language consciousness and, consequently, the rejection of the use 
of French and English in Flanders. 
 
The far right is in general extremely vague about individual rights. The VB programme refers 
essentially to allowances and social benefits in negative terms (i.e. by targeting those who 
shouldn’t be given the right to be cared for by the state) but hardly mentions other 
fundamental human rights. Moreover, the party sets up a long list of ‘offences’ which should 
lead into somebody being deprived of their basic rights or nationality: ‘making oneself guilty 
of a major crime or repeatedly committing minor offences; undermining in words and in 
writing or otherwise Western cultural, political, religious and philosophical traditions and 
customs; being a member of a group, association, political or religious movement whose 
purpose would be to achieve the above undermining; and, more generally, every serious attack 
on public order and the moral standards of society’ (Dewinter quoted by Spruyt, 1995:100). 
 
Ethnic/cultural nationalism provides the necessary ideological and theoretical background to 
the specification of the links between the individual and the community. In defining the latter, 
the FN and the VB refer essentially to the generic concept of ‘nation’ seen as a unit of 
individuals who share the same culture and ethnic origins and a clearly defined territory. This 
narrow conception is of great importance to the understanding of the far right model of 
‘particularistic’ and ‘closed’ society (Swyngedouw, 1995a). As a consequence, individuals or 
groups which do not possess a similar ethnic or cultural background can hardly claim to 
become members of the existing community. According to the FN, ‘the nation is a community 
of language, interest, race, memories and culture, in which men blossom. The individual’s 
links with the nation include the historical roots, the memory of dead people, the past, heredity 
and heritage’ (For a French future, 2002). From these common elements of history and 
tradition grows the inherited national community. ‘Tradition is the mirror of the true nature of 
the nation’, to quote the VB Principles. It is not just language but also 'origin' which defines 
who forms part of the national community. As explained by Dewinter referring to the case of 
Brussels: ‘speakers of other languages can also be Flemings’ (quoted by Spruyt, 1995:88). 
 
The concept of ‘identity’, as conceived by the VB, remains largely contingent to the German 
notion of ‘people-nationalism’ (volksnationalismus) based on language and culture whereas 
the FN's ideology is directly linked to the traditional model of French state-nationalism. For 
the VB, the nation must coincide with the state, or, more precisely, state borders should be 
drawn from existing ethnic and cultural boundaries. For this reason, the modern Belgian 
federal state poses an insoluble problem which can only be solved by the creation of an 
independent Flemish state whose frontiers would be defined on the grounds of ethnicity. In 
this view, the actual language criterion, on the basis of which Belgium has been legally 
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divided into a French-speaking and Flemish-speaking part since 1961, should be abandoned 
so that Flanders could recover the ‘occupied’ territories. Brussels should relinquish the actual 
bilingual status to become Flemish again. The existing border with France is accepted, 
provided that the Flemish state take ‘all necessary steps to ensure that they [the ‘Flemings’ in 
French Flanders] can live in accordance with their nature’ (Principles). Similarly, the border 
with the Netherlands must be respected, although a federal state embracing the Netherlands 
and Flanders would be desirable in the future.  
 
From the above conception of the linkage between individuals and society emerges an 
exclusive view of nationhood and citizenship, which largely restricts the opportunity for 
potential newcomers. The acquisition of nationality takes place within the model of 
particularistic and culturally closed society which rejects immigration and the integration of 
‘undesirable’ foreigners. For Le Pen, ‘the French nation is essentially based upon blood, 
territory and memory (...) One should be aware of the contemporary menace on France and its 
biological substance’ (Libération, 14 October 1996). Le Pen’s party joins with the VB in 
promoting a restrictive regime of nationality which would base access to citizenship 
exclusively on the requirements of blood (jus sanguini) and reject consequently all 
naturalisations on the basis of birth on the territory or marriage to a native. 
 
 
 
2. Electoral support and patterns of party system integration 
 
One important lesson to be drawn from the above analysis is that of the role of a coherent set 
of beliefs with strong utopian and populist components in the emergence and durable 
installation of the far right in France and Belgium. The ‘new society’ utopia to which far right 
leaders refer can be considered a major element of the overall electoral appeal to mass 
electorate by parties such as the VB or the FN. This probably highlights in return the failure of 
the Belgian Front national to establish itself as a permanent actor of the political scene in 
French-speaking Belgium in spite of a number of electoral performances at the local level 4. 
Not only can the electoral achievements of parties such as the VB or the FN be accounted for 
by the ability of those movements to mobilise resentment, protest and hostility against the 
'political class' (Betz & Immerfall, 1998), but also their success can be seen as the result of 
those parties' capacity to offer - apparently - tangible, concrete and alternative policies to those 
of the established parties which no longer seem to be in a position to solve major social 
problems. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The Belgian FN has not yet developed a coherent ideology, but rather seems to have copied some key elements from both 
the VB and FN party platforms. The party has remained marginal to national politics, representing just one of the numerous 
extreme right 'groupuscules’ in French speaking Belgium. Throughout its existence, Féret's movement has been riven with 
internal fights and party factionalism, multiple splits and endemic organisational failures. Until 1995, the Belgian FN had 
never won enough votes to achieve political relevance. In 1995, the party obtained 7.5 per cent of the votes in the Brussels 
Capital Region and 5.2 per cent in the Walloon Region. In 1994, it captured one seat in the European Parliament as well as 
47 and 26 municipal council seats in the Brussels and Walloon Regions respectively. Most surprising was the result in 
Charleroi, where five unknown members of the party were elected without any program or campaign, totalling 11 per cent of 
the votes. In the 2004 regional elections, the FN polled 5.4 per cent of the votes in the Brussels Capital Region (+ 2.4 points 
compared to 1999) and 8.1 per cent in the Walloon Regional council (+ 4.2). In the 2003 general election, the party received 
3.5 per cent of the vote for the Chamber in the Brussels Region and 5.6 per cent in the Walloon Region. 
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a) Mass mobilisation and party organisation development 
In Belgium, the VB made its first impressive breakthrough in the 1989 European and 1991 
general elections (Ackaert, De Winter, Swyngedouw, 1996). In 1995, Dillen's party secured 
12.5 per cent of the votes in Flanders following the party's outstanding performance in the 
1994 municipal election in Antwerp, in which the FN received 28.5 per cent of the polls. In 
the 2000 municipal elections in Antwerp, the Vlaams Blok’s score rose to a further 33 per cent 
which brought the party 20 of the 55 seats in the city council. In the 1999 and 2003 national 
elections, the Vlaams Blok won 15.4 and 17.9 per cent of the vote respectively in Flanders. In 
the 2004 regional elections, it received 24.2 per cent, becoming one of the largest parties in 
Flemish parliament. 
 
In France, the results of the presidential election in April 2002 showed a significant increase 
in the support for the two leaders of the far right with a total of 19.2 per cent of the vote cast 
in the first round and 17.8 per cent (around 5.5 million votes) in the first ever second round 
featuring a far right candidate in France (Cautrès & Mayer, 2004). Despite a relative drop for 
FN candidates in the subsequent legislative ballots in June 2002, with 11.1 per cent of the 
votes, and the inability of the far right to weigh significantly on the electoral outcome, the 
2002 legislative and presidential elections bore testimony to the consolidation of the position 
of the extreme right in the French political landscape. The 2004 regional and cantonal 
elections provided further confirmation of the strong implantation of the far right at the local 
level and the hegemony of the Front national over the splinter group led by Bruno Mégret 
under the banner of the MNR. 
 
Together with more than half of the top-level party elites and a sizeable segment of grassroots 
members, Bruno Mégret, General Delegate of the party, left the FN in January 1999 to form a 
rival group, the Mouvement National (MN) subsequently renamed Mouvement National 
Républicain (MNR). In attracting 2.3 per cent of the votes in the first round of the 2002 
presidential ballot and 1.1 per cent in the subsequent legislative election, the mégrétiste 
faction demonstrated the blatant failure by its leader to build a political bridge between the 
mainstream and extreme right poles, and the incapacity of the MNR to resolve the 
fundamental contradiction between Le Pen’s anti-system populism and any sort of 
technocratic credibility 5. 
 
The amplitude and recurrence of these electoral performances clearly raises the vote for the 
VB and FN above the status of a simple protest vote which has often been regarded as a key 
feature of mass mobilisation by these parties. Over the years, both of them have enjoyed a 
growing loyalty of a group of ‘stable’ supporters. In France, the FN has managed increasingly 
to stop relying upon very volatile one-time voters and instead stabilise a pool of voters 
accounting for around 85 per cent of his electorate between elections (Swyngedouw, Boy, 
Mayer, 2000; Evans & Ivaldi, 2005). In the first round of the 2002 presidential election, the 
                                                          
5
 The electoral setback has been joined by severe financial and legal difficulties. In March 2000, the Appeal Court of Paris 
confirmed the decision to grant legal ownership of the FN name and logo to Le Pen and deprive the mégretiste organisation 
of any share of the FN’s financial assets. In the summer of 2002, the MNR leader saw the collapse of his citadel in Vitrolles 
and the forced departure of his wife from the town hall after the annulment of the municipal election result of 2001. All this 
against the context of revelations of close links with certain radical Right-wing groups and a failed attempt on the life of 
Jacques Chirac by Maxime Brunerie, a former MNR candidate in Paris, in July 2002. In October 2002, Catherine Mégret lost 
the municipal by-election in Vitrolles against the socialist candidate. In January 2004, Bruno Mégret was condemned to a 
one-year ineligibility sentence and 10,000 Euros penalty after the court ascertained irregularities in the MNR party finances 
during the 2002 electoral campaigns. 
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two extreme right candidates attracted about 90 per cent of Le Pen’s 1995 voters and 86 per 
cent of those who had chosen a FN candidate in the 1997 ballot, a level of voting loyalty 
comparable to those observed in the precedent elections of 1995 (presidential), 1997 
(legislative) and 1998 (regional). In the 2003 general election and the 2004 regional contest, 
the Vlaams Blok enjoyed the highest level of electoral loyalty in Flanders, with 85 and 95 per 
cent respectively of its previous voters casting their votes for the extreme right. Similar 
figures were noticeable in the 1995 and 1999 ballots 6. 
 
The stability of the electoral support for the far right in post-election surveys is echoed by that 
of the geographical spread of the vote and the existence of local electoral strongholds. 
Founded in Antwerp on the ruins of extreme right and radical Flemish nationalist 
‘groupuscules’, the Vlaams Blok won momentum from the moment it started to stress its anti-
immigrant agenda in the mid 1980s. Between 1985 and 1991, the party’s electoral influence 
mostly spread around its bastion city. Since 1991, the party has maintained its appeal to voters 
in Antwerp while managing to secure electoral support in other areas, mainly Oostende and 
the municipalities surrounding it, the area around Kortrijk (West-Flanders), Gent (East-
Flanders) and its surroundings and the area around Beringen (Limburg) (Van Craen, 
Swyngedouw 2002). Since the mid 1980s, the French FN has enjoyed its highest levels of 
support in the Paris region, Nord Pas-de-Calais, Alsace, Rhône-Alpes and the Southern 
Mediterranean sea-board (Perrineau, 2003). The 2002 national and 2004 local elections 
showed a very similar spread with the FN achieving its best scores in the constituencies of 
urban France faced with deindustrialisation, unemployment, an immigrant population and low 
law-and-order. 
 
With regard to party organisation, the strengths of the two parties are well in evidence. In 
Belgium, success in the polls and the new party finance laws adopted in 1989 gave the VB a 
considerable financial boost to establish a broadly based propaganda machine, and to organise 
congresses and one-day seminars at which party activists expound their vision of society 
(Spruyt, 1995). Over the years, public funding of the Vlaams Blok by national and local 
authorities has increased in proportion to the total number of votes received by the party in 
elections. In 1989 the Vlaams Blok received nearly 75,000 Euros from the national 
Government; by 2000, public funding amounted to over 1,685,000 Euros. In addition, from 
2001 onwards, the Flemish Government granted public subsidies for all political parties 
represented in the Flemish parliament which brought the Vlaams Blok an additional 62,000 
Euros. As early as 1991, the party managed to establish local branches at the arrondissement 
level: by 1999, the Vlaams Blok claimed a total of 165 of those local organisations which, 
given the high level of party centralism, retain limited autonomy. It must be noted that, with 
regards to party organisation, the 2004 transformation into Vlaams Belang did only result in a 
number of ‘cosmetic’ changes: for instance, the new procedure to appoint the party leader was 
in fact already effective under the former Vlaams Blok’s set of rules (Verstraete, 2005). In 
theory, candidates to party presidency are put forward by the party Council at national party 
congress. However, it must be borne in mind that all members of the Council are actually 
appointed directly by the incumbent president himself.  
                                                          
6
 Exit-polls surveys by ISPO-K.U.Leuven on behalf of the Flemish public broadcaster VRT conducted in the national 
elections of 1995 and 1999 showed that once voters had switched to the Vlaams Blok, they became rather loyal to it. Between 
1991 and 1995, about 75 per cent of previous 1991-voters were loyal to the extreme right, compared to 68 per cent of all 
voters who were loyal to their 1991 choice. Between 1995 and 1999, the comparable figure rose to 79 per cent (as compared 
with 66 per cent in all voters) (Swyngedouw, Beerten et al, 1995, 1999). 
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Membership figures of the Vlaams Blok are still subject to discussion as no external control 
over the actual number of members is possible. The party claimed over 1,200 members in 
1981 and 17,170 in 2000. Looking patterns of electoral entrenchment in local elections shows 
that the party is best implanted in the Antwerp Province and the Brussels Capital Region (Van 
Craen, Swyngedouw, 2002). Like its French counterpart, the Vlaams Blok has maintained 
links with a number of flanking organisations on the extreme right fringe of the system, which 
for most of them originated in the collaborationist groups during WWII and/or the radical 
Flemish nationalism nebula, and which have accompanied the party since its inception. 
Founded in 1986, the Vlaams Blok Youth organisation became a powerful tool for political 
recruitment and mobilisation. In addition, party leader Dewinter tried to establish a number of 
peripheral – the so-called ‘circle’– organisations as did Le Pen did in France. However, beside 
a few neighbourhood organisations, mostly based in Antwerp, and some clear-cut follow-
travellers organisations (e.g. Hart voor Antwerpen – a Heart for Antwerp), such a strategy did 
not prove very successful so far. 
 
In France, FN individual membership rose from an estimated 15,000 in the mid-1980s to 
about 40,000 in 2002; in 2004, Le Pen’s party claimed a total of 60,000 registered members. 
The 1990s also witnessed the development of the basic structures and reinforcement of the 
entire party apparatus at both local and national levels, with branches in all the 96 departments 
of metropolitan France and most of the urban areas. This internal development of highly 
centralised autocratic party organisations was associated with the founding of a large number 
of flanking groups, associated newspapers, youth organisations (the Front national de la 
Jeunesse (FNJ) was created in 1974), think-tanks and clubs, whose main purpose is political 
lobbying within specific fields of concern or particular social and occupational sectors. The 
FN’s peripheral organisations include a variety of small scale issue-oriented groups 7 which, 
for most of them, are nothing but empty shells relying upon a very small number of dedicated 
activists (Ivaldi, 2005). The 1988 bill and subsequent legislation on public funding for 
political parties in France led to the FN availing of increasing financial resources: in 2004, Le 
Pen’s party was granted a total of 4,580,000 Euros proportionally to the total number of votes 
obtained in the 2002 legislative elections. 
 
b) Political isolation and policy-making impact 
The above glance at the results of elections over the past fifteen years reveals the amplitude of 
changes which have taken place in the balance of power between the main competitors in the 
French and Flemish polity. Despite their electoral performances however, both the FN and the 
VB remain isolated on the rejected margins of mainstream politics with very little opportunity 
to play a decisive role in governmental formation. 
 
                                                          
7
 National Club for Hunting, Fishing and the Environment, General Alliance against Racism and for the Respect of French 
Identity, Le Pen Generations, France-Ecology-Environment, SOS Children in Irak, Anti-unemployment Front, National 
Banking Club, National Club of French Jews, National Federation of Modern Company and Freedom, National Club for the 
Disabled, National Club for French repatriated from North Africa, Association for the Abolition of Income Tax and Tax 
Reform, Club of the French living abroad, National Club of French Farmers, National Club of Veterans, National 
Coordination of Health Professionals, National Club of European Women, National Club of Pensioners, National Club of 
Taxi Drivers, The League for Life, National Union of Corsicans. The MNR has created very similar clubs and organisations. 
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Patterns of party co-operation and competition: diverging strategies? 
As mentioned earlier, the change over from Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang was mainly a 
matter of changing the party’s image in the general public and increase its coalition potential 
to break from the political isolation imposed by mainstream parties through the cordon 
sanitaire. It must be noted that the actual interpretation of the latter ranges from strict refusal 
of any contact whatsoever with the extreme right (i.e. the Green party’s stance) to the rejection 
of all coalitions at both the local and national levels (that is the position of all other Flemish 
parties). For its part, the VB tried to broaden its appeal to public figures and potential 
defectors from other parties: the party managed to do so on a couple of occasions in the 2003 
national and 2004 regional elections. In return for their new allegiance, the new comers were 
instantly given prominent positions within the party. Despite however the ever growing 
electoral impact of the far right and the many attempts by Vlaams Belang leaders to build 
links with potential coalition partners, there still should be no formal collaboration between 
mainstream parties and the extreme right in the forthcoming 2006 municipal elections. One 
important reason for that is the warning by a number of French-speaking parties (in particular 
the Parti socialiste) at the Federal level that they would refuse to enter into national 
government coalition with Flemish parties compromised with the Flemish extreme right at the 
local level. 
 
In France, the early 1990s witnessed a significant change in patterns of party cooperation and 
competition with the end of the ‘conciliatory’ phase which had seen the development of 
formal and informal links between the mainstream right and the FN since the electoral 
breakthrough of the far right in the 1983 local by-election in Dreux. Collusion and tactical 
manoeuvring, which had been developed as a response to the alteration in the balance of 
power between the moderate right and their new challenger, became much less likely, as it 
was evident from electoral outcomes that Le Pen’ party was the only beneficiary of such a 
strategy. Although contacts between the mainstream right and the FN did take place 
subsequently 8, the RPR-UDF alliance clearly rejected the construction of a right-wing pole 
that would embrace the extreme right, and agreed to join with parties of the left in 
systematically setting up an electoral ‘republican front’ against the FN wherever the far right 
candidate would be in a position to move forward to the second round of electoral contests. 
This political isolation and lack of coalition potential were reinforced by the impact of the 
institutional setting on the dynamics of national politics and the specific bipolar constraints 
inherent in the two-ballot system. In France, pressures for change coming from parties outside 
the mainstream such as the FN have traditionally met with strong resistance from the 
majoritarian logics of the electoral system and the influence of the mechanical process of 
translating votes into parliamentary seats (Ivaldi, 2003). 
 
In the face of the strong commitment from the ruling parties of the right, the FN shifted its 
own position during the mid-1990s from one which favoured a broader right-wing alternative 
to the existing RPR-UDF coalition to one of hostility towards the mainstream parties of the 
right and President Chirac in particular 9. In 2002, Le Pen continued to oppose fiercely both 
Chirac and Jospin as ‘collusive members’ of the ruling ‘establishment’, and to build upon the 
                                                          
8
 In the aftermath of the 1998 regional elections, a number of RPR-UDF candidates were elected as Presidents of the 
regional councils with the public support from FN councillors: Jean-Pierre Soisson in Bourgogne, Charles Baur in Picardie, 
Jacques Blanc in Languedoc-Roussillon and Charles Millon in Rhône-Alpes. 
9
 This strategic U-turn was well evidenced in the 1997 legislative election with 132 FN candidates being purposely put 
forward to the second round (76 confronting both the left and the moderate right in three-way elections). 
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‘neither right nor left’ strategic line initiated by the FN in the mid-1990s to strengthen its 
electoral appeal to disillusioned voters on both sides of the political spectrum 10. 
 
Public perception and policy-making impact 
In France, the general perception of the FN is one of an extreme and anti-democratic 
organisation: in the second round of the 2002 presidential election, the spectacular 
demonstrations against Le Pen’s party by all political parties of the left, associations, 
Churches and trade unions were clear indications of the strong rejection of the far right by the 
vast majority of voters. Opinion polls surveys regularly point to the high level of rejection of 
the FN by the public: 85 per cent have a negative opinion of the party and over two thirds (68 
per cent) of the French still regard Le Pen’s party as a ‘threat to democracy in France’ 
(SOFRES-Figaro Magazine survey, 23-24 March 2005; SOFRES-L’Express survey, 9-10 
April 2003) 
 
Yet, the ideas of the FN have entered the realm of public debate and are shared by a 
proportion of the electorate which goes beyond the actual electoral strength of the far right. A 
trend analysis of opinion polls over the 1984-2003 period of time shows a fairly stable public 
support for the FN’s themes and ideas, between 20 to 25 per cent of the whole population 
(SOFRES-Le Monde-RTL, November 2003). Not only has Le Pen’s ideology managed to 
infiltrate the beliefs of a significant section of French voters but the controversial issues 
publicised by the far right have also been partly absorbed by mainstream parties of the right 
thereby significantly influencing policy-making and the re-orientation of party manifestos. 
This was well evidenced by the Pasqua (1993) and Debré (1997) restrictive laws on 
immigration or the tough conservative-authoritarian stance on crime taken by the UMP in 
2002, at least partly in an attempt to steal the FN’s thunder on law-and-order (Ivaldi, 2002). 
More recently, the restrictive Plan on immigration introduced by Interior Minister Dominique 
de Villepin in May 2005 was part and parcel of the Government’s desire to tackle the issue of 
illegal immigration to occupy the potential political space for the extreme right. This was 
further evidenced by Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposals after his re-appointment to the Ministry of 
Interior in June 2005, which included a disguised call for immigration quotas and a 
reinforcement of police and custom controls at France’s borders in order to increase by 50 per 
cent the total number of illegal immigrants sent back to their country of origin before the end 
of 2005. “I want to put and end to all forms of misappropriation, marriages in name or 
medical benefits (…) I also intend to be stricter with regard to the wages, housing and 
integration conditions of those applying for family reunification”, said Nicolas Sarkozy (9 
June 2005). The Prime Minister’s additional comment that “priority should be given to the 
French for jobs” went curiously unnoticed albeit a clear reference to one of the key themes of 
the far right’s ideology. 
 
Whilst the overwhelming majority of Flemish voters claim that they would never vote for the 
Vlaams Blok, the influence of the extreme right on other parties’ electoral platforms and 
ideological orientations is blatant from the changes in mainstream politicise with regards to 
                                                          
10
 The party’s failure to gain parliamentary representation and counter the UMP’s successful incorporative strategy in the 
legislative ballot led to increasing intra-party factionalism and the re-opening of the longstanding opposition among FN top-
level elites between the old guard embodied by Bruno Gollnisch, Marie-France Stirbois or Jacques Bompard, and the so-
called ‘modernists’ who advocate for an ideological tone down and favour a more conciliatory approach to building links 
with parties of the moderate right. 
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proprietary issues of the far right such as immigration, asylum-seekers, integration of ethnic 
minorities or law-and-order. As evidenced in the French case, there has also been a clear trend 
towards a stricter approach to these issues by incumbent and opposition parties alike. For 
instance, the opening of temporary detention centres for asylum-seekers whose application 
was turned down and the launch of new deportation programmes for illegal immigrants to be 
sent back to their country of origin were highly publicised by the Government in the press and 
the media. Additional legislation commands that new comers must now get on a training 
integration course including Dutch language tuition under the threat of loosing eligibility for 
social benefits otherwise. Of all Flemish parties, the liberal VLD certainly took the hardest 
stance on immigration and criminality. Despite controversy, the former VLD Minister of 
Justice in the Federal Government requested for instance that scientific research be conducted 
on the relationship between criminality and ethnicity. Instead of ‘integration’, the new Flemish 
Government prefers to use the word ‘inburgering’ which doesn’t translate well into English 
but points to the fact that ethnic minorities and immigrants have to become members of the 
national community like any other Flemish citizen. For this, the 2004 government declaration 
foresaw the implementation of the individual ‘Becoming Citizen’ Contract (containing the 
obligation for new immigrants to run a so-called ‘integration course’ including the 
aforementioned obligation to learn Dutch). Recently, the Flemish Government was planning 
to try ban immigrants and ethnic minorities with a low command of the Dutch language from 
social housing, pointing to the fact that the knowledge of a common language is essential to 
living together. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding contextual, cultural and historical specificities, the comparative analysis of 
the Flemish VB and French FN reveals a number of converging elements with regards to the 
electoral growth, organisational development and institutionalisation of both far right parties 
in their respective country since the mid 1980s. The gradual increase in the electoral support 
for the far right has largely altered the existing balance of forces and posed unprecedented 
challenges to the traditional format of national politics in Flanders and France. Though they 
are faced with systemic isolation, lack of coalition potential and strong rejection by a majority 
of voters at the margin of the political system, the FN and VB insidiously continue to exert 
their influence on many spheres of public debate, party ideology and policy-making at both 
national and local levels.  
 
The in-depth and cross-national analysis of the FN and VB utopia points to important 
similarities in the views and ideological beliefs of their non-democratic ideological corpus 
based upon ethnocentrist authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values. The two far right parties 
considered for the analysis share common views with regards to immigrants, women, 
institutions, political parties, unions, social and economic issues, or the EU. Overall, the 
development of a core ideology seems to be more dependent on the anti-system, populist and 
ethnocentrist views of the parties than on the nation-state wherein those parties emerged and 
developed. Interestingly, diverging views on how the very concept of nation-state did not 
prevent for instance collaboration between the Belgian and the French far right in the 
European Parliament (Abramowicz, 1996). 
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As hypothesised in this chapter, the presence of a structured ideological system of beliefs and 
representations of social reality can be considered a crucial factor in the rise and electoral 
stabilisation of peripheral actors such as the FN and the VB, which contributes to differentiate 
those from simple protest or single-issue parties. Despite significant changes in patterns of 
party competition and co-operation and a number of tactical adjustments, the ideological 
corpus and weltanschauung of both organisations –as deduced not only from official party 
literature but also from the political behaviour of party leaders– has proved very consistent 
over the years. There is also some evidence of a broader West-European far right ideological 
space in development and the present analysis ought to be complemented by further insight of 
comparable parties’ ideology in other countries. 
 
Lastly, in relation to current debate over the ideological nature of the specific type of extreme 
right or neo-populist parties, and the many classificatory attempts by scholars, it is clear from 
our analysis that the VB and FN ideological corpus is non-democratic by nature. Although 
these parties stress their commitment to the basic principles of representative democracy and 
claim to have abandoned their fascist legacy, they pose a significant threat to fundamental 
individual rights and freedom of organisation. Their policy proposals rely on blatant 
discriminating measures on the ground of cultural differentialism or neo-racism (Taguieff, 
1986). In many respects, the FN and VB political objectives aim to challenge the established 
post-war social-democratic consensus: in that, their ultimate political goals do not differ 
significantly from the essential revolutionary attempt by fascism at creating a new order on the 
ruins of the old society. 
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